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Abstract
Innovation–the combination of invention and social learning–can empower species
to invade new niches via cultural adaptation. Social learning has typically been
regarded as the fundamental driver for the emergence of traditions and thus20
culture. Consequently, invention has been relatively understudied outside the
human lineage–despite being the source of new traditions. This neglect leaves
basic questions unanswered: What factors promote the creation of new ideas and
1
practices? What affects their spread or loss? We critically review the existing lit-
erature, focusing on four levels of investigation: traits (what sorts of behaviours25
are easiest to invent?), individuals (what factors make some individuals more
likely to be inventors?), ecological contexts (what aspects of the environment
make invention or transmission more likely?), and populations (what features
of relationships and societies promote the rise and spread of new inventions?).
We aim to inspire new research by highlighting theoretical and empirical gaps30
in the study of innovation, focusing primarily on inventions in nonhumans. Un-
derstanding the role of invention and innovation in the history of life requires
a well-developed theoretical framework (which embraces cognitive processes)
and a taxonomically broad, cross-species data set that explicitly investigates in-
ventions and their transmission. We outline such an agenda here.35
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1 Introduction
During rapid environmental change, the success of hominid populations has depended on
their ability to devise new fitness-enhancing behaviours that exploit novel aspects of the en-
vironment and are socially transmitted to conspecifics [1]. The extensive social transmission40
of novel behavioural variants is called innovation. Although humans are certainly an ex-
treme case in their capacity to innovate, innovation is likely to be an adaptive strategy in
many species. Our understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of such species will be lim-
ited, unless we attempt to document and model these innovation processes.
To explain innovation as a form of (Darwinian) cultural evolution requires (a) variation,45
i.e., the invention of novel behaviours or artefacts; (b) heredity, i.e., the transmission of novel
traits between individuals; and (c) selection and other processes that can establish some traits
as stable characteristics of a (sub)group [2]. Most research on the dynamics of cultural evo-
lution has focused on transmission and selection; above all, on social learning and its mech-
anisms. In this paper, however, we emphasise the importance of investigating invention as50
a critical source of variation and thus a driver of cultural evolution.
As scholars of cultural evolution, we want to understand how natural and cultural selec-
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tion act (at the level of the behavioural trait, the individual, the dyad, the group, and the
species) to produce varying types of cultural dynamics that lead to innovation (or not). The
comparative method is a useful tool for elucidating such general principles—for understand-55
ing the evolution of innovative capacities generally, and for understanding the human case
specifically. Species differ in their characteristics (demographic, ecological, psychological,
and morphological) and in the ease with which they can be studied for particular purposes.
In Section 2, we survey existing comparative and theoretical scholarship, which stud-
ies invention and innovation at multiple levels of analysis. Prior research on invention and60
innovation has been unequally distributed across psychological mechanisms, taxa, levels of
analysis, and methodologies. It has also largely neglected the cognitive-computational pro-
cesses involved in producing inventions. As we show, the available data are too sparse and
employ methodologies too poorly matched to the research questions to afford a cogent cross-
species analysis of the reasons why species vary in their cultural capacities (particularly for65
invention).
After reviewing what is currently known about invention, and identifying major knowl-
edge gaps and methodological flaws, we propose a set of promising research directions (obser-
vational, experimental, and theoretical) that could transform our understanding of invention
and innovation in the natural world 1. To make progress, the field needs a systematic effort by70
empirical researchers to collect data from a wide range of species, in dialogue with theoreti-
cal scholarship that connects computational-cognitive and evolutionary processes. Such data
and theory are essential to unearth the general principles behind innovation as an adaptive
strategy.
1Space restrictions prevent us from thoroughly reviewing the state of the literature regarding diffusion and
establishment of inventions in detail, but we describe some findings and also some gaps in the social learning and
cultural evolution modelling literature relevant to determining (a) which behaviours spread and become estab-
lished in group repertoires, and (b) how population structure affects information transmission and accumulation.
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1.1 Definitions75
Here, we define the terms we use in discussing the three distinct processes central to the
study of innovation: the creation, transmission, and establishment of novel behaviour.
We define invention as the creation of novel behaviour. Researchers of nonhuman ani-
mals often call these inventions “innovations.” We use the term innovation to refer to inven-
tions that succeed in diffusing widely through a (sub)group to become stable characteristics80
of that (sub)group 2. Another source of definitional confusion is that the word “innovation“ is
used to describe both process (i.e., the transmission and establishment of an invention) and
product (i.e., a behaviour that has been acquired by multiple members of a population through
initial, individual invention and subsequent spread via social learning). We use “innovation”
to refer to process and “an innovation“ to refer to product.85
Invention has been defined differently by different camps of researchers, according to the
research question they are addressing. Some researchers cast their nets broadly, including
any novel behaviour as an invention. Others impose additional restrictions, e.g., that the
behaviour serve an obvious useful purpose, or impact the performer’s fitness. Sometimes
it is stipulated that the behaviour must be something that a typical member of the species90
would not do under similar circumstances [6]; this parallels the stipulation in US patent law
that a patentable invention could not be created by a ”person having ordinary skill in the
art.“ Typically a behaviour is not described as an invention if it is acquired via successful
social learning.
To evaluate the selective pressures that influence processes of invention, it makes sense95
to use a broad definition. When an individual stochastically produces a behaviour it has
never performed or seen performed before, we call that novel behaviour an invention. This
2In doing so, we essentially follow the tradition of Schumpeter, who distinguishes mere novelties from those
that change the “production function“ of society [3; 4], rather than Rogers, who uses innovation to refer to “an
idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new” [5].
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definition excludes new behaviours acquired via social learning. It also excludes behaviours
that occur naturally at certain points in development for all individuals, given particular
environmental circumstances3. It does include (a) novel behaviours produced by processes100
other than insight learning, (b) behaviours that are creative but apparently useless or costly,
and (c) behaviours that are likely accidental the first time they are performed. Notably, we
do not require inventions or innovations to be fitness-enhancing for individuals or groups.
We make no reference to cognitive processes in our definition because there are many
ways something new might come about. Some inventions are produced by accident, when105
individuals fortuitously perform old actions in new circumstances, thereby producing new
outcomes. Some inventions are generated by ineffectual social learning, when an animal
fails to produce the observed behaviour and produces a new one instead. Other inventions are
produced via deliberate problem solving, either trial-and-error learning or insight learning
(i.e., solving a problem without trial-and-error, via mental rearrangement or restructuring of110
elements in a problem, perhaps based on past experience with some elements of that problem,
resulting in a solution); this is important when old solutions fail in novel circumstances, such
as the absence of some critical material. A specific evolutionary scenario that explains why
some classes of individuals are more likely to invent than others is likely to apply to inventions
generated by a subset of these cognitive processes. We therefore favour an inductive approach115
that starts with a broad definition of invention and attempts to explain patterns through some
combination of cognitive process, life history, and ecological context .
3It does so through our stipulation that the production of the behaviour is stochastic, i.e., involves some con-
tingency.
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2 What do we know about invention?
A comprehensive exploration of invention and innovation is multi-scale. It investigates how
natural and cultural selection act on variation at the level of the behavioural trait, the indi-120
vidual, the dyad, the group, and the species. It grounds these processes in ecological context.
And it acknowledges that the link between selection and invention is mediated by the cogni-
tive processes that generate inventions and lead to their diffusion and establishment.
We organise our discussion of the existing observational, experimental, and theoretical
literature around four levels of analysis: behavioural traits, individual characteristics, eco-125
logical circumstances, and group characteristics. In doing so, we collapse some of the lev-
els above (e.g., dyad and group), while weaving others (cognitive-computational processes)
throughout.
2.1 What characteristics of behavioural traits make them more likely to be
invented?130
What can be invented by an organism? This question is critical but challenging to answer.
An idea or behaviour could be ”invented“ on multiple occasions at different times—or at the
same time in different places [7]. The frequency with which a behaviour is re-invented might
provide clues to how easy it is to invent.
The question of what can be invented has been addressed empirically and theoretically.135
Empirically, researchers have attempted to document the range of a species’ inventions—
called the count method—and have categorised these into broad domains (see for example:
capuchin monkeys: [8]; orangutans: [9]; chimpanzees: [10]). A second empirical method gives
humans and other animals problems to solve, usually a puzzle box with a reward inside,
and asks how individuals invent solutions to the tasks (e.g. [11–13]). Both methods allow140
researchers to quantify and compare the behaviours that can be invented by an individual or
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a species, but the experimental approaches cannot be used to assess the range of inventions
because possible behaviours are restricted by the task itself [14].
Researchers also face a methodological problem if they require that inventions have func-
tional utility. When a novel behaviour is produced, its costs and benefits are likely unknown145
to the animal and the analyst. Some useless-looking behaviours are incorporated into indi-
vidual and group repertoires. Take, for example, the human tradition of eating toxic cassava,
which requires complex and non-intuitive processing to be edible, or the insertion of fingers
in eye sockets as a bond-testing behaviour in capuchin monkeys [8]. The invention of these
traditions probably involved a risky, apparently unpleasant novel behaviour. This would have150
looked like a mistake to a researcher coding the inventor’s behaviour in a short-term study.
These examples challenge the notion that researchers can or should pre-judge the functional
utility of behaviours.
It is more tractable to explore variation in the cognitive processes by which inventions are
produced. Inventions can be produced by insightful problem solving, and many experiments155
are designed to explore that process. But inventions can also arise by serendipity, e.g., when
individuals make mistakes in copying a target behaviour, or fortuitously perform a behaviour
in a new context with desirable results [14]. Such inventions do not (necessarily) require
insight learning, but they are no less new, are possibly useful, and may be transmitted to
others.160
Such discussions can be informed by existing theory on the computational and cognitive
underpinnings of invention. Boden identifies three distinct creative processes [15]: the explo-
ration of an existing framework; the combination of existing elements; and the “transforma-
tion” of the space of possibilities (e.g., by adding new elements). Hofstadter and colleagues
[16; 17] offer more explicit formal models of the underlying computational substrate. In one165
model [17], concepts are represented in memory such that they afford exploratory variation
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about their central “theme”, with nearby variations being easier and more likely than distant
ones. When the implications of such concepts intersect, they can be recombined into new con-
cepts; combinations that are “close by” are easier than those that are distant [18]. Although
substantial translation is required to adapt these computational models to nonhuman ani-170
mals, it is easy to see how they line up with existing notions like serendipitous discovery (mild
variations on known behaviours or chance analogies between old and new behavioural con-
texts), trial-and-error learning (“random” variation or recombination), and insight learning
(more selective variation or recombination).
Recombination is essential to human invention [16; 19]. Rather than having to assemble175
the entire solution de novo, human inventors combine multiple existing solutions in novel
ways [20]. The camera phone did not have to be built from scratch; inventors could put it
together by modifying and combining well-understood technologies. Insofar as existing solu-
tions are highly modular—with well-defined ways of linking them together—the inventor’s
job becomes easier.180
We know very little about the possibility of invention by recombination among nonhuman
animals, where it might take the form of combining known behaviours in new ways or combin-
ing known behaviours with novel contexts or substrates. There is, however, some promising
experimental work in some bird species that construct compound tools without trial-and-error
learning, reinforcement or cueing; these findings suggest both recursive capacities (since tools185
are combined to produce new tools) and an ability to perceive when novel tools are required to
accomplish a goal (e.g. [21]). Learning more about the abilities of wild animals to invent via
recombination of existing behavioural elements requires documentation of individuals’ be-
havioural repertoires at a granularity rarely achieved in current studies. This is even more
true for invention via transformation.190
Cross-species differences in what characteristics of behavioural traits make them more
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likely to be invented are most likely driven by the underlying processes of invention. While it
is probably the case, across species, that tinkering variation is more common than recombi-
nation, which is more common than transformation, species may vary substantially in their
capacity to invent by these different processes, with some limited to variation and others195
capable of all three.
2.2 What characteristics of individuals make them more likely to invent?
The relationship between individual characteristics and propensity to invent has been ad-
dressed via theoretical models, literature reviews, experiments, and observational studies
(with captive and wild animals). We organise our survey of the existing literature around200
structural variables associated with differences in the propensity to invent: age, sex (the two
sexes have different reproductive strategies and hence different time and energy budgets),
dominance rank (a measure of resource monopolisation ability), social network position, and
personality. We note, however, that the mechanisms driving such associations likely depend
on the underlying processes that drive invention, e.g., enhanced opportunity (via neophilia,205
network position, or free time), persistence, or necessity (see section 2.3 for more detail).
Cross-species comparisons face steep challenges. Although some meta-analyses have been
performed (see section 2.3), interpretation is complicated by the methodological problems
that we discuss below. When cross-species findings are inconsistent, this could be driven
by methodological differences, or by differences in the way that structural variables link to210
underlying mechanisms across species. Firmer conclusions await the collection of more data
sets designed specifically to answer these research questions using comparable methods.
Age: It is not clear how age affects invention. In a review of the primate literature, Reader
and Laland [22] concluded that adult primates invent more often than do immatures, with the
exception of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), which exhibited the opposite pattern. Kummer215
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and Goodall [23] also claimed that invention in chimpanzees was more common in juveniles
than in adults, though this claim was subsequently disputed [10]. In a meta-analysis covering
mammals and birds, Amici et al. [24] also found that older individuals were more likely to
invent, but there was no consistent methodology for defining inventions.
These comparative reviews share a deep difficulty: They are not based on reports from220
researchers explicitly measuring invention, and are susceptible to observer biases (such as for
behaviours that look especially human-like or peculiar to the human eye). Larger literature
reviews (e.g. [22; 24]) do not always distinguish between invention as “success at solving a
problem“ versus invention as “novelty.” The former definition may be biased towards older
(larger, stronger, more experienced) individuals and the latter towards younger ones.225
Only one observational study in the wild has made a systematic attempt to record inven-
tions during data collection, as they arise in a population, rather than using data collected
for other purposes. Perry et al. [8] conducted a decade-long study of wild capuchin monkeys
(Cebus capucinus) to measure rates of invention and innovation and determine the character-
istics of especially inventive individuals. Older, more socially-central individuals were more230
likely to invent new forms of social interaction, while younger capuchins were more likely to
invent new foraging-related behaviours and new ways of manipulating their environments, as
well as their own bodies. Younger capuchins also exhibit a more diverse repertoire of actions
when trying to open Luehea fruits [25], though it is not clear whether this is due to higher
rates of invention in younger animals or experience-related pruning of inefficient techniques235
in older ones.
The findings from experimental approaches are, likewise, mixed. For example, juvenile
red-fronted lemurs (Eulemur rufifrons) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) were more likely to
be the first to solve a two-action task [26], and to learn about new species of nuts to crack [27].
But older meerkats (Suricata suricatta) and captive callitrichids (7 species, from the genera240
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Leontopithecus, Callithrix and Saguinus) were more likely to solve a novel task (extracting
food from a puzzle box), perhaps because of their greater dexterity [11] and motor competence
[28].
Depending on the species and type of task, either the enthusiasm of youth and/or the
wisdom of age can lead to inventiveness. Future studies should make separate evaluations245
of age-related changes in the following contributors to inventiveness: (a) attraction to novel
objects or situations (neophilia, tendency to explore), (b) tenacity in problem solving, (c) cre-
ativity in finding solutions (e.g. number of options tried), and (d) physical strength and dex-
terity. This is consistent with our broader suggestion to focus on the cognitive and physical
processes of invention.250
It may also be the case that individuals of different ages actually learn differently. Gopnik
et al. [29] argued that human children have more flexible and exploratory learning strate-
gies than adults. As a result, children are better than adults at deducing unusual abstract
causal principles from observations, whereas adults are less creative but more efficient in
their learning strategies. Other researchers have claimed that young children are proficient255
social learners before they develop creative problem-solving skills, at least for tool use [30; 31].
As Fogarty et al. [32] note, there are almost certainly age-related changes in particular types
of learning skills that need to be taken into account, along with population structure, when
developing models of cultural evolution. Agent-based models developed by Lehmann et al.
[33] to better understand the circumstances that favour the accumulation of modifications260
over time (cumulative cultural evolution, CCE) examined the co-evolution of life history stages
with the timing of use of social learning versus individual learning. They found that CCE is
favoured when infants learn from non-parental adults (oblique social learning) while juve-
niles use a mixture of individual learning and learning from their peers (horizontal social
learning).265
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Sex: Predictions regarding the impact of sex on propensity to invent stem from differences
in body size (and hence competitive ability and free time) as well as differences in knowledge
as a consequence of sex-biased dispersal. As with age, it is not clear whether females or males
are more inventive, although in one meta-analysis of data on novel foraging tasks in 29 bird
and mammal species, the larger-bodied sex was more likely to innovate [24]—a finding that270
supports the “Free Time/Excess Energy hypothesis” but not the “Bad Competitor hypothesis”
(see section 2.3). Considering the different life histories of males and females, one might
predict that the dispersing sex would need to invent more than the sex that remains with
kin in the birthplace, because the dispersing sex is more likely to encounter novel situations.
When a disperser joins a new group, it may also need to learn behaviours from the new group275
members. It might also have to be inventive because it has less access to other individuals it
might copy. The data are mixed regarding this hypothesis, however. For example, female red-
fronted lemurs (the stay-at-home sex) and male meerkats (the leaving-home sex) were both
more likely to solve an experimental task [11; 26]. While the primate literature suggests that
males may be more inventive than females [22], Perry et al. [8] found no differences between280
male and female capuchins across a decade of observations.
Dominance rank: The “necessity is the mother of invention” hypothesis predicts that low-
ranking individuals should be more inventive, while the “free-time and energy” hypothesis
predicts that high-ranking individuals, who have greater access to resources, will use their
spare time to find new things to do [24]. To date, meta-analyses on invention in foraging tasks285
yield no evidence that dominance predicts inventiveness across species [24]. For example, low-
ranking chimpanzees are sometimes more inventive than high-rankers [22], while the most
dominant starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) participating in an experimental problem-solving task
were the fastest to learn how to solve the task [34]. In wild capuchins (Cebus capucinus) and
wild hyenas (Crocuta crocuta), invention seems unrelated to dominance rank [8; 35].290
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Social network position: The position an individual occupies in its social network could
foster opportunities for being inventive. There is a well-established relationship between net-
work position (specifically, the spanning of “structural holes”) and invention in the literature
on human invention [36]. In the animal literature, better-connected great tits (Parus major)
and baboons (Papio ursinus) were more likely to find and use novel foraging patches, relative295
to individuals with more limited social connections [37; 38]. Proximity to conspecifics might
prompt certain kinds of object exploration, due to stimulus enhancement or social facilitation;
however a meta-analysis by Amici et al. [24] including 20 species of birds and mammals did
not find a convincing relationship between proximity to others and propensity to innovate,
though the relationship was stronger in wild animals than in captive animals. The rela-300
tionship between network position and inventiveness may be contingent on behavioural type:
Perry et al. [8] found that more social wild capuchins were more prone to invent new social
interactions, while less social individuals were slightly more likely to invent new foraging
behaviours or ways of manipulating their own bodies.
Personality: Methods for studying animal personality are now well developed and there305
is considerable evidence of a role for personality in a range of animal decision-making [39].
The time is ripe to conduct more rigorous investigation of the impact of personality traits
on propensity to invent and transmit innovations. Brosnan and Hopper [40] discuss five
psychological factors that may limit innovative capacities, either in invention or transmission,
by inducing individuals to stick with what they know rather than exploring novel options:310
neophobia (aversion to novel objects or situations), conservatism (not wanting to try new
things), conformity (behaving like the majority), functional fixedness (being disinclined to
use familiar objects in novel ways), and the endowment effect (a preference for objects/foods
already in their possession rather than potentially more desirable objects not yet in their
possession). Although the authors cite some evidence in favour of these ideas, the evidence315
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is still scant and more comparative data are desirable. Stable inter-individual differences in
proclivity to invent, as seen in foraging guppies, Poecilia reticulata, [41], support a role for
personality traits in inventiveness. Starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) that were quickest to feed in a
novel experimental environment were also generally the ones who solved a task more quickly,
which might suggest that boldness or exploratory proclivity promotes invention [34]. Male320
grackles (Quiscalus lugubris) that were less neophobic, more exploratory, and more persistent
were more likely to succeed in opening a box containing food [42], and the main predictor of
success for wild hyenas in obtaining food from a puzzle box was diversity of techniques tried,
with the primary inhibitor being neophobia [35]. Neophobia also seems to explain speed of
problem-solving in raccoons (Procyon lotor): less neophobic and more persistent individuals325
were more likely to solve a puzzle-box task [43]. Horses (Equus caballus) that were more
active, more tenacious, and better at inhibition control were better able to feed from a novel
feeder [44]. Amici et al’s [24] meta-analysis of 38 studies of foraging tasks in 20 species of
birds and mammals showed that individuals that are more explorative, neophilic and (to a
lesser, non-significant extent) persistent were more prone to invent; exploration more strongly330
predicted invention in captive rather than wild animals.
On this account, propensity to invent is (in part) an emergent consequence of personality
traits like persistence and neophilia. Problem-solving experiments with several species of
birds provide further support for this hypothesis [12]. Certain aspects of morphology also
enable more diverse ways of manipulating the environment. Interactions between cognitive,335
morphological and personality/motivational traits are thus likely to result in both individual
and species differences in rates of invention [45; 46].
The literature on humans is broadly consistent with the provisional findings from the
comparative literature, with plenty of speculation as to the types of personality traits likely
to promote invention and innovation. Sternberg [47], summarising his life work in this area,340
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speculates that all of the following traits may play a role in promoting innovation: willing-
ness to overcome obstacles (possibly akin to perseverance), willingness to take sensible risks,
tolerance of ambiguity, and tendency to seek opposition (which might be seen as contrari-
ness or as anti-conformity). Simonton [48] emphasises some overlapping traits, including in-
dependence, anti-conformity, openness, “behavioural and cognitive flexibility and boldness”;345
because he views human creativity as a Darwinian process in which successful inventions ar-
rive through variation and selective retention [49] – a point of view that goes back to William
James [50] – Simonton emphasizes the role of these traits in “the production of ideas both
numerous and diverse.”
Mood in humans can affect inventiveness. As a transient emotional state, mood is not the350
same as personality, but some personality types might be more prone to particular moods.
People with positive moods were more creative than those with neutral moods [51] and, in gen-
eral, individuals more sensitive to positive rather than negative outcomes were more creative.
Although emotions are increasingly studied in nonhuman animals, their role in inventiveness
has not been carefully examined.355
These ideas resonate with computational theories of creativity and invention. Such the-
ories emphasise novelty-seeking, whether through the recognition (and avoidance) of expe-
riential “ruts” [17] or through intrinsic reward from encountering new experiences that can
be profitably “compressed” through learning [52]. Many of the traits cited by Sternberg and
Simonton (as well as the nonhuman literature) reflect the novelty-seeking dispositions de-360
scribed by formal theory; even the mood results can be understood through the interplay of
intrinsic reward (from novelty-seeking behaviour) and extrinsic reward (food, threats, and
other “rewards” from the environment).
It is likely that age, learning strategy and personality traits interact to produce varia-
tions in inventiveness. Natural selection could have favoured both (a) within-species shifts365
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in personality traits or attitudes relevant to learning strategies across different life history
stages, and (b) different timing of these shifts across species that vary in their life history
strategies [25]. For example, younger capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus) are less neopho-
bic and more playful, creative, curious, opportunistic, and active than older monkeys; they
are also more prone to attend to foraging conspecifics [25]. These traits have obvious impli-370
cations for propensity to invent and copy novel behaviours. Formal theory, combining models
of biological and cultural evolution with computational models of the inventive process, could
sharpen these hypotheses and guide subsequent empirical research. Indeed, theory is essen-
tial to select the most fruitful possibilities, given the combinatorial explosion of species and
factors involved.375
2.3 What circumstances make inventions more likely?
Several contextual factors have been suggested as drivers of invention: (a) necessity (e.g., the
most inventive individuals have little access to resources because they are subordinate, in
poor body condition, and/or too young to compete effectively); (b) access to opportunities (e.g.,
higher encounter rates with particular resources promote attempts to exploit these resources380
[53], as with new forms of tool use); and/or (c) free time/energy (e.g., the most inventive indi-
viduals are higher ranking, in better body condition, and of the larger sex, because they need
to spend less time foraging and can assume higher risk foraging strategies [23; 24]. Of course,
these are not mutually exclusive possibilities, and all have received mixed support. Amici et
al. [24] attempt to distinguish the “Bad Competitor” hypothesis (which they equate with “ne-385
cessity”) and the “Excess of Energy” hypothesis. Their analysis did not convincingly support
either hypothesis, as there were no clear differences related to rank or body condition. Fur-
thermore, older animals were more prone to innovate in their meta-analysis, but the authors
predicted that younger individuals should be more innovative under both hypotheses. These
16
authors argue that their finding that the larger-bodied sex was more innovative supports the390
“Excess Energy” hypothesis; however, the assumption that the larger sex needs to spend less
time foraging seems debatable, as the larger sex may (a) have a higher metabolic rate or (b)
have a reproductive strategy requiring more time spent in social competition relative to the
smaller sex.
These methodological difficulties could be resolved by measuring invention, body weight,395
competitive ability, food intake, and activity budgets more explicitly, in a way that permits
greater cross-study consistency; the variables used in this meta-analysis [24] were, of course,
measured for different research agendas. It would be particularly desirable to measure “free
time” independently from “excess energy” and competitive ability; these variables are not nec-
essarily correlated. Dominants, by definition, have higher competitive ability, but they may400
have less free time because they devote more time to servicing social relationships, compared
to subordinates. And alpha males may require extreme amounts of energy to maintain their
bodies in good fighting condition to defend their positions. We also note that these hypothe-
ses could be extended from comparisons within species to comparisons between species or
between ecological contexts; some accounts of hominid inventiveness, for example, appeal to405
both our low competitive ability and substantial variability in the ancestral environment.
2.4 What characteristics of groups make inventions more likely to spread?
Innovation requires more than invention; novel behaviours must then spread and stabilize
in a (sub)group. How group characteristics (and the structure of social networks) affect the
spread of inventions depends on the type of behaviour, which in turn influences the mode of410
transmission. Some inventions, like internet memes or simple behaviours, are easily trans-
mitted, and spread like an infectious disease (simple contagion). Other inventions (e.g., an
elaborate food extraction technique) are less easily transmitted; they follow a “complex” con-
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tagion dynamic, where a single exposure is not sufficient for acquisition [5; 54].
Social networks: In simple contagion, information may spread more rapidly through dense415
rather than sparse networks. In dense networks, individuals interact more with each other,
which increases opportunities to observe others [33]. For example, information was shared
more rapidly on the social network site Digg, compared to the less dense Twitter [55]. Highly
clustered networks are predicted to impede information flow, as information gets “trapped”
in local clusters [56].420
If transmission follows complex contagion dynamics, however, an individual’s probability
of adopting novel traits is higher if she receives social reinforcement from multiple neigh-
bours. Here, clustering is beneficial. In a study on the adoption of health behaviour, new
behaviours were more readily and widely adopted in clustered networks than in random net-
works [57]. Conversely, Smolla and Akçay [58] show that with complex contagion dynamics,425
dense networks coordinate on a few common traits, which impedes the spread of novel traits
generated by individual learning.
Individuals may preferentially associate with those sharing similar phenotypes, result-
ing in positive assortment or “homophily” at the network level. This can affect transmission.
Homophily may preclude some individuals from obtaining social information because the in-430
dividuals who are more likely to generate information [59] may not associate with naïve ones
[56]. Conversely, negative assortment (“heterophily”) may facilitate the transfer of infor-
mation between information generators and non-generators. Thus, the propagation of in-
formation through a social network could be limited by positive assortment of information-
generating phenotypes, and enhanced by negative assortment. A similar mechanism plays435
out in human social networks; because advantaged individuals are more likely to adopt a new
behaviour, and because they tend to associate with each other, beneficial behaviours tend to
spread to already advantaged individuals [60]. This mechanism can be subtle, however; in
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an experimental study, homophily promoted the adoption of a novel health behaviour in an
online social network [61]. This might be because humans are more likely to be influenced by440
others sharing similar traits—a version of directed social learning—and limited homophily
across a mixture of characteristics [61]) facilitates directed social learning.
These results suggest that variation in natural (and experimental) networks can inform
which network structures promote or retard information flow, holding individual character-
istics constant. Such research is most productive in dialogue with formal models that predict445
transmission in real (and experimental) populations of humans and nonhuman animals [54].
Age composition of groups and populations Age is a critical variable, affecting how
much individuals learn socially (vs. asocially) and whom they learn from. Despite this, there
has been little empirical or theoretical work on how age variation in a population affects the
spread and maintenance of innovations.450
One class of models [33; 62] considered the evolution of when and how long individuals
learn socially vs. individually, and the consequences of these strategies for the accumulation
of culture across generations. They show that two factors affect the evolution of a learning
schedule that can sustain innovations across generations: the efficiency of different kinds of
learning, and the trade-off between learning or inventing new behaviours vs. exploiting them.455
Another class of models investigates the spread or decline of socially learned behaviours
in age-structured populations with age-dependent learning rates. Fogarty et al. [63] use this
approach to understand the impact of social learning on fitness-changing behaviours (e.g.,
obtaining more education and having fewer children). They found that transmission of such
behaviours between unrelated individuals can cause demographic transitions in which the460
age-structure rapidly changes. These models take into account the reciprocal feedback be-
tween the age-structure of a population and the traits that change it; such feedback can have
profound effects on the spread and maintenance of cumulative culture. Another agent-based
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model of cumulative (but demographically neutral) culture [64] endows individuals with dif-
ferent learning rates as well as bias in whom they learn from. In that model, populations465
accumulate more cultural traits if individuals live longer (because they have more learning
opportunities), but the populations have lower rates of cultural change. Interestingly, biasing
social learning towards older individuals, even if they are more conservative, results in a rate
of cultural change similar to or even higher than when individuals meet at random. This is
because older, more experienced individuals are better cultural models.470
These disparate modelling approaches all show that the age-structure of the group—and
how individuals of different ages learn from others—can profoundly affect the spread and
maintenance of cultural traits. At the same time, this topic remains underexplored; for in-
stance, we do not yet know how age assortment in social networks affects the spread of inno-
vations, or how age-dependent invention propensities interact with demographic structure475
to determine long-term dynamics of cumulative culture.
3 What don’t we know about invention and innovation?
Our survey of the existing literature on invention and innovation revealed substantial method-
ological and theoretical gaps. This is unsurprising, given the longstanding focus on social
learning in the study of cultural evolution. In this section, we discuss some of those gaps and480
suggest ways to fill them.
3.1 Gaps in the experimental literature
To understand the role of invention and innovation in biological and cultural evolution, we
need to answer basic questions across a range of taxa: What gets invented? By whom? In
what circumstances? And does it “stick”? To answer these questions, it is essential to ground485
research on animal invention (and innovation) in solid natural history. Until now, most em-
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pirical research on inventions has suffered from one or more of three flaws:
• Observational work on behavioural novelty has been based on retroactive interpretation
of data collected for other purposes. It is subject to human memory and research biases
about which behaviours are recorded and interpreted as novel.490
• In experimental studies, a novel task is presented to the animals by a researcher who
has explicitly designed the task to be abnormal enough (for that species) that the task is
definitely novel; participants often need to be trained to engage in the task. Invention
in these studies is often defined as being good at solving the task in the way the human
researcher intended. Such approaches do not permit the research subjects to express495
their full range of creativity.
• Both observation and theoretical studies are relatively divorced from formal models of
the inventive process, which could inform study design and reconcile competing hy-
potheses.
How could the field move forward? Determining rates of invention is perhaps the greatest500
empirical obstacle to research on inventions, closely followed by characterising the (changing)
space of possible inventions (which is necessary to assess what characteristics make inven-
tions more or less likely). Systematically cataloguing the building blocks of species’ inventions
(i.e., the behaviours that could be combined in order to create new ones) would help address
the issue of what is “invent-able”. Lack of systematically collected data on inventions also505
hampers our understanding of how species differ in their inventive abilities, and how often
particular creative products are independently invented 4.
4Of course, it is not possible to anticipate specific inventions that introduce new components, though longitu-
dinal data can be used to estimate the rate of these “jumps” [65]. Despite the combinatorics, human invention is
surprisingly predictable on short time scales [66], and the same is likely true for nonhumans.
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Progress requires the collection of longitudinal data sets that systematically record the
fine details of species-typical behaviour, along with any novel behaviours observed. Such data
have transformed the study of human invention in science and art [67; 68]. It is essential that510
we collect similar data for large numbers of individuals, social groups, and species.
The only naturalistic study of invention that has attempted systematic documentation
of entire repertoires focuses on ten white-faced capuchins groups [8]. In this 10 year study,
a large staff of observers (previously trained to identify all elements of the species-typical
repertoire) was trained to report any novel behaviour in detail, across behavioural domains.515
A observer with 26 years of experience on the study population evaluated each observation,
terming it an invention only if (a) it had not been seen previously in that individual or group
during the lifetime of the putative inventor in the 10-year period, and (b) the behaviour was
absent in the repertoires of at least some groups.
By collecting such data, along with association patterns and gaze directions, researchers520
can infer which behaviours are new and which are socially learned or readily invented in-
dependently. In addition to characterising the inventive space, long-term studies collect de-
tailed data about the kinship, age, association patterns, personalities and relationship his-
tories of the individuals. This enables researchers to answer questions about the qualities of
individuals that promote inventiveness. These studies can also gather consistent data about525
competitive ability and activity budgets, allowing them to adjudicate between hypotheses
about inventive context (e.g., “necessity” vs. “excess energy”).
One challenge in defining new behaviours is deciding how finely to parse behavioural
sequences. All behaviours (novel and not) are constructed from basic “building blocks”: motor
patterns that are part of a species-typical repertoire. Invention occurs in the application of530
these building blocks to new contexts, or their combination into new sequences. If coding is
sufficiently fine-grained (e.g., all motor actions and the objects and contexts they are applied
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to), it should be possible to make more objective decisions about what is novel. Advances in
machine learning may accelerate such coding, ultimately mitigating observer bias [20; 69].
Another challenge faces studies of the “invent-ability” of behaviours. We cannot fully535
imagine or predict the universe of “behaviour space” for behaviours that have not yet been
invented but could be (in theory). We can, however, ask what kinds of behaviours are likely
to be invented (and what properties of individuals make them more likely to invent certain
kinds of behaviours), by documenting all the behaviours that have been witnessed. We can
then assess their relative invent-ability by noting how often they appear in individual and540
group repertoires, taking into account exposure to appropriate contexts for displaying these
behaviours. This approach could also address more specific questions, like: (a) given that a
specific motor pattern has been performed in one context, what is the likelihood that it will
be performed in another context? and (b) given that an individual has performed part one
of a (plausible) behavioural sequence, what is the probability that it will perform step two545
and step three? These data can be used to inform modelling approaches, including detailed
models of the computational processes of invention.
Standard techniques for representing the dynamic structure of invention space in human
science or technology (reviewed in [18]) could be used to represent behavioural repertoires
and quantify the novelty of particular behaviours. Behaviours could be characterised by the550
presence or absence of different building-blocks, and the novelty of behaviours quantified by
their distance from typical ones, in an appropriate metric [18; 70]. This approach could distin-
guish incremental variations on existing behaviours from more substantial recombination—
or the more radical transformation of invention space [15; 17; 20]. Invention space could
alternately be represented by a network, in which building blocks are linked when they are555
observed in combination; the novelty of a particular behaviour is characterised by its struc-
tural position, e.g., whether it combines building blocks that have not been combined before,
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whether it introduces a new building block, or whether it combines building blocks from dis-
tinct behavioural clusters [65]. Similar techniques could be used to represent the way that
distinct individuals combine specific behaviours in different contexts (paralleling the repre-560
sentation of scientists combining particular chemicals and methods to study certain diseases
[66]). These rich representations can serve as input to models predicting the probability of
behaviours being combined, or transferred across contexts, by particular individuals; they
would be valuable input for data-driven models of underlying cognitive processes. They also
connect to perhaps the biggest gap in our knowledge of social transmission amongst nonhu-565
mans: Whether individuals “prefer” to learn some inventions over others–i.e. whether and
how the particular characteristics of inventions affect their subsequent transmission, as in
Rogers [5]). This is an essential step to a broader understanding of innovation in the animal
world.
3.2 Gaps in the theoretic literature570
New inventions do not appear randomly in the space of all possible inventions; there is struc-
ture in how that space is (stochastically) explored. As formal models of creativity [17] suggest,
inventions that are close to existing behaviours are easier to create [18]. Some behaviours
may also be easier to combine than others (and individuals may vary in the “combinability”
of their representations). Models of cultural evolution have paid very little attention to these575
issues, treating the space of possible inventions as unstructured. Among the few exceptions
is a paper by Lewis and Laland [71], in which the authors distinguish between inventing
completely new traits or tools, combining existing ones, and modifying them. This model
abstracts away from individual, dyad, and network-level dynamics, and only considers the
long-term dynamics of cumulative culture in a population. A more recent paper by Smolla580
and Akçay [58] imposes a simplified structure on the space of cultural traits, in which each
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trait builds on a single precursor. This framework can be extended to allow individuals to
combine existing traits, or for a single trait to give rise to multiple “descendants”. By varying
the probabilities of such events [71] and the structure of the population [58], we can ask how
cumulative culture evolves in different inventive spaces.585
Another interesting direction is to develop models of individual and social learning in
more realistic dynamic invention spaces. Foster et al. [18] provide a possible foundation for
this approach. They systematize several measures of novelty for patents, based on different
representations of the space of existing knowledge and different models of the inventive pro-
cess. They show that novelty measurement depends on appropriate, domain-specific models590
of invention, building a connection to more abstract models [16; 17; 52]. Such techniques for
representing invention spaces and modelling inventive processes can be built into individual
and social learning models to determine the probabilities of inventing new behaviours and
the ease with which they are transmitted socially.
Substantial research on the diffusion of innovations in human groups has examined the595
characteristics of individuals who transmit and maintain inventions—either from the point
of view of the learner, the model, or their relationship [5]. There is strong empirical evidence
for inter-individual differences in motivation, capacity, and opportunity for cultural learning
(for a review see [32; 72]). Nevertheless, theoretical work on individual and social learning
has largely neglected such differences. Some studies have varied the propensity for individ-600
ual vs. social learning, or let individuals with different social learning strategies compete
(e.g. [73; 74]). But there is more to individual variation than learning propensity. Future
models should explicitly incorporate age structure, sex, dominance, kinship, and personality
as possible factors influencing attention and cultural learning. This will make models more
complex, but this complexity is needed to better understand how individual differences and605
preferences interact to shape the diffusion of innovations. Turning to the role of social struc-
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ture: Some research has been conducted on the factors affecting transmission within a dyad.
That said, empirical studies that look at how new behaviours or information spread along a
network as a function of the distribution of individual traits remain rare, beyond humans.
Likewise, most theoretical models assume that new behaviours appear in random individu-610
als (akin to mutations), although we know that different classes of individuals might invent
at different rates, as discussed in section 2.2. The location of such individuals in a network,
their connectedness, as well as the correlation between individual traits over a network, will
affect whether, and how, newly invented behaviours spread in a population. These questions
remain largely unstudied, limiting our understanding of how network structure, diversity of615
individual traits, and their distribution over the social network affect the dynamics of inno-
vation and cultural evolution.
4 Conclusions and future directions
Understanding the prevalence and drivers of innovation across the history of life requires an
ambitious research agenda, with a renewed focus on invention. We cannot currently state620
how common innovation is as an adaptive strategy, because we cannot accurately quantify
invention, the social learning of novelties, and their establishment as parts of group culture.
Some species (e.g., cephalopods) may be extremely inventive as individuals, but have little
capacity (or use) for social learning. Others may be less inventive, individually, yet able to
transmit and stabilise the rare inventions that do occur. Humans are quite good at both. Are625
other species?
To discover the evolutionary principles that shape invention and innovation, it is neces-
sary to collect data from multiple, strategically-chosen species. Comparative data are scant,
particularly naturalistic data in which the animals themselves determine the problems to
be solved. They are collected with such diverse methodologies that it is difficult to combine630
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them into a credible comparative analysis. Available studies, which primarily target individ-
ual characteristics promoting invention, yield different answers within and between species.
Clearer results will be obtained when the scientific community has obtained more data, using
more stringent definitions and methodologies like those described here, and considered vari-
ation at the level of behaviour, individual, context, and group, preferably integrating these635
levels of analysis. The roles of age, personality, and social network structure in invention are
particularly understudied (both empirically and theoretically). The few models of cultural
evolution that take age or life history into account seem to indicate that learning strate-
gies shift over time; it is thus critical to incorporate age structure into these models. Richer
models are needed to guide empirical work through the combinatorial thicket of possibilities,640
including a robust engagement with computational models of the invention process.
Although field (and captive) experiments will always play an important role in under-
standing certain aspects of cultural evolution (especially mechanisms of invention and learn-
ing), they cannot substitute for careful collection of natural history data on behavioural varia-
tion of wild animals making choices in their natural environments. Longitudinal field studies–645
particularly those employing consistent data recording methods across decades–have a par-
ticularly important role to play in documenting how behavioural repertoires for individuals
and groups change over time, in accordance with natural ageing processes, changes in group
composition, and ecological changes. Such studies will provide opportunities to ground-truth
models of cultural evolution that make predictions about the rates at which inventions will650
rise and spread under different assumptions about the network structure and demographic
characteristics of groups.
Although there has been recent progress in building theoretical models of the invention
and transmission of behaviours [58; 71], most models still treat invention as a blackboxed,
random process like genetic mutation. In parallel to the enriched treatment of biological655
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variation in the extended evolutionary synthesis [75], models should incorporate variation at
the level of the trait, individual, dyad, group structure, and environment. More fundamen-
tally, these simple models typically treat invention as incremental adjustments to existing
behaviours. They should allow more complex recombination of behaviours and/or contexts,
and draw on formal models of computational creativity [16; 17; 52] as well as data-driven660
work on human invention [18; 68].
In this review, we have focused on models of invention, but transmission is critical to
establishing inventions in behavioural repertoires. We know that individuals differ in their
rate of invention and the inventions they create. We also know that the network position
of individuals affects the probability that inventions will spread, becoming innovations. It is665
essential to develop models of invention and social learning that take structure into account—
the dynamic structure of inventive space, and the dynamic structure of social networks.
Empirical data should guide the formulation of such models. Three methodological chal-
lenges slow empirical work on invention and its role in cultural evolution: (1) Documenting
behavioural repertoires (individual and group) and their change over time; (2) Document-670
ing invention rates, and distinguishing between independent inventions and socially learned
adoptions of traits; (3) Documenting what proportion of “invention space” – i.e. combinations
of behavioural elements and objects in routinely encountered ecological settings – is occupied
by a particular individual or species and how that changes over time. Solutions to these chal-
lenges will greatly speed progress at the intersection of theoretical and empirical research on675
cultural evolution.
It is not by transmission alone that cultural evolution occurs. Invention provides the
behavioural novelty on which cultural evolution operates. Until we invent the methods and
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